Department of Human Services, Division of Mental Health, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Barbara Schwarz and Utah State Records Committee, Defendants and Appellant.

Case No. 20030324-CA

COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH

2003 UT App 406; 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 308

November 28, 2003, Filed

NOTICE: [*1]  NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Writ of certiorari denied Dep't of Human Res. v. Schwarz, 90 P.3d 1041, 2004 Utah LEXIS 94 (Utah, 2004)

PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt Lake Department. The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Mental Health v. State Record Comm., 2002 UT App 33, 2002 Utah App. LEXIS 224 (2002)

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

COUNSEL: Barbara Schwarz, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se

Mark L. Shurtleff and Joel A. Ferre, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

JUDGES: James Z. Davis, Judge, Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge, William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

OPINION:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

Barbara Schwarz appeals the district court's ruling that the Department of Human Services, Division of Mental Health (Division) was not required to disclose the name of a person providing a referral to the Division pertaining to Schwarz.

Schwarz made a request under the Utah Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2- 101 to -909 (1997 & Supp. 2003), for all records pertaining to her that were in the possession of the Division. The Division provided an electronic mail message that referred Schwarz's name to the Division for mental health services, but it redacted the author's name pursuant to a policy to ensure the anonymity of persons making referrals. The Executive Director of the Department of Human Services affirmed [*2] the decision. On appeal, the Utah State Records Committee (Records Committee) agreed that the Division properly classified the name of a referent as a "private" or "controlled" record; however, it ordered disclosure of the name because "the public interest favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access." See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2- 403(11)(b) (Supp. 2003) (allowing disclosure of records classified as private, protected, or controlled if Records Committee determines "public interests favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access"). The Division petitioned for judicial review in district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1997) (allowing district court de novo review of final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(8)(a) (1997) states that "the court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if [*3] the interest favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access." The district court vacated the Record Committee's order requiring the Division to disclose the referent's name, after finding that "the interests favoring access are outweighed by the interests favoring restriction of access to the referent's name." The court specifically found "that interests such as guarding against the invasion of personal privacy, protecting the safety of private individuals, and promoting candid referrals for public assistance favor restriction of access to the referent's name."

The issue before this court is whether the district court correctly ruled that the interests favoring access to the referent's name are outweighed by the interests favoring restriction of access. The Division contends that because Schwarz has failed to analyze or adequately brief the issue, we should not address her arguments. See Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, P13, n.2, 48 P.3d 888. We agree. Schwarz's briefs fail to properly address or analyze the issue before this court. The briefs contain no citations to the record in this case, and no analysis of relevant [*4] statutory or case law.

Although the Division also briefed the merits of the appeal, neither an opposing party, nor the appellate courts, are obligated to address deficiencies in an appellant's briefing. See Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, P 8, 995 P.2d 14 ("An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and analysis to the reviewing court."). Accordingly, briefs must include citations to the relevant portions of the record, demonstrate that issues raised on appeal were preserved, marshal the evidence supporting any disputed factual finding, and cite and analyze relevant law. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). If an appellant fails to adequately brief the issues, the appellate court may decline to consider the argument. See Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In addition, rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "all briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings, and free from burdensome, [*5] irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters." Non- complying briefs can be stricken or disregarded. See Utah R. App. P. 24(j). Schwarz's briefs contain material that may be stricken or disregarded by this court.

Schwarz requests this court to consider that she is a pro se litigant without the resources available to the Appellee in this case. However, Schwarz has frequently appeared in the district and appellate courts in this state and may be held to the standard appropriate to her experience. Since 1990, Schwarz has filed no fewer than fifteen pro se appeals in this court or the Utah Supreme Court, as well as three petitions for writ of certiorari. We also note that this appeal results from a civil proceeding initiated by Schwarz. "When an individual avails herself of the judicial machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency on the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate." Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, P 4, 67 P.3d 1000. Accordingly, Schwarz may "be charged with full knowledge and understanding of all relevant statutes, rules, and case law." Id. at P 5.

Based upon the failure to adequately brief the issue before the court, we decline [*6] to address Schwarz's arguments on appeal and affirm the district court's judgment.

James Z. Davis, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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