(1) Allowing outer Org B1s to develop their own Ops ideas to submit for approval -- and demanding such.

(2) Allowing outer Org B1s to run approved Ops based on first hand data as long as it's kept within the framework of the Op.

(3) Providing a believable source of an operation, thereby filling the vacuum, so that Scn. isn't dubbed in as source.

(4) When planning an Op, mentally following it all the way through looking for areas which need to be taken into account; and taking the enemy's viewpoint of the Op for the same purpose.

(5) Full and correct use of target series for each Op. Targets simply stated and specific as possible. (Helps in debugging and to hat inexperienced persons) (6) The major target of the Op is based on a *real*, current situation.

(7) When hitting a group or individual, hitting their finance and comm lines.

(8) Getting an enemy to attack another enemy.

(9) Working off of programmes which align Ops actions to other Br 1 sections and other Bureaus and which contain command intention from LRH on down. (Admin scale and priorities aligned) (10) Working for VFPs and having such reflected in the statistics, rather than a lot of sub-products.

(11) Exposure of real, documented enemy crimes and material of a scandalous nature.

(12) Utilizing current events and trends (and finding the right buttons) for exploitation in Ops channels.

(13) Keeping plans bright and simple and on target.

(14) Finding real buttons.

(15) Keeping up persistent pressure until the product is achieved.

(16) Establishing some type of feedback line so that exact effects are known.

(17) Mini-hatting by giving examples of successful Ops.
Unsuccessful:

(1) Ops on random attackers instead of WHOs, just to be doing Ops for Ops sake.

(2) Dubbing in buttons.

(3) Trying to do everything on an Op by yourself from a management or senior executive level, and therefore not allowing origination or juniors to wear their hats.

(4) A one shot approach, rather than persistent pressure and several channels to a product.

(5) Harassment actions.

(6) Not planning or providing for a believable source of the Op so that a vacuum is left allowing the recipients to dub in Scn amongst others.

(7) When planning not considering all the effects as the Op runs it's full course, and not taking the enemy's viewpoint, leaving critical holes in the plan which will later backfire on you, make your scramble on an emergency basis to handle or make the Op less effective.

(8) No use of, or misuse of, target series. (too few, unspecific targets; many unaligned, hard to understand targets).

(9) An Op or major target based on revenge or out-of-PT situation.

(10) Producing, and stats aligned with, many sub-products as opposed to VFPs.

(11) Manufacturing documented enemy crimes (there are rare exceptions to this) (12) Long involved and overly complex operations with many conditionals which if any or any one of several aren't done exactly would cancel out the effectiveness of the Op. (There are rare exceptions) (13) No feedback line; results of Ops not really known or dubbed in.

# # # # #
DATA NEEDED BY OPS ON EACH LOCATED WHO 1. Standard ODC with time track and a brief, summarized, well-rounded picture of a terminal. (Following #2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 are the key areas data is needed) 2. Criminal background of terminal.

3. Financial involvements (inflow & outflow of money) 4. Legal involvements (summary of actions) 5. Terminal's main interests, personal habits, fears, vices and any other items of interest.

6. Friends and enemies on the terminal's 1st Dynamic Friends and enemies on the terminal's 2nd Dynamic Groups that the terminal belongs to and any groups or terminals, who are enemies of that group.

7. What the terminal considers valuable & is protecting 8. Simple org board the terminal is on, clearly noting his position and his seniors and noteworthy juniors.

9. What persons have the power to fire terminal from the position he holds.

10. Any rules or regulations that if broken would cause the terminal to lose his job/position.

11. Any regulations concerning licenses that the terminal holds that would cause him to lose his license if violated (i.e. law, medical, contractor, etc.)

12. Scandals, conflicts, disputes directly or indirectly connected to terminal.

13. Documents that show criminality of terminal (i.e. cheating on income tax, discrediting data in personal letters, use of drugs, etc.)

14.

15.
Ops Planning Ops planning goes over all the data on the WHO that Ops research has compiled and with all the data available on the WHO, plans out channels of attack on the WHO that will effectively remove/restrain the WHO from his position of power. Ops planning on a WHO is done using the data series, target series, all Scientology tech applicable, and intelligence tech.

The following points should be followed in doing an operation:

1. Initially plan out at least 3 channels of attack with the data you have at hand. Do not wait forever to getall data collected, but also do not run Ops that would be dangerous without essential data.

Basically a brighter idea is needed with less data available. 3 channels being done instead of less is because there is a higher percentage of getting results and also this will tend to confuse and spin the WHO as there are 3 attacks instead of just one.

2. Continue to plan Ops utilizing feedback from completed Ops so that the WHO has persistent attack on him and continual pressure. Do this consistent attack until the WHO is obliterated.

3. Stay away from harassment actions that are only for the sake of doing channels or revenge. ie: Sending pizzas from every Pizza delivery restaurant. These basically have been unsuccessful as they do not achieve any real effective result, except for letting the WHO know that he is under attack. There may be times when 50 pizzas every day being sent to a WHO would be effective, but this would be in such a case where the WHO was restimulated heavily by seeing pizzas, smelling pepperoni or seeing pizza delivery boys, etc.

4. Always include a way of getting feedback in an operation, so you know what type of result you are getting and for further planning of channels in those areas that give good results.

5. Ensure proper security is planned in an operation, ie: use of an untraceable typewriter, paper without fingerprints, proper covers by FSM's, etc. (See security write-up and security section data in hat materials of Ops US hat checksheet) 6. Use the target series exactly to programme out an operation on a WHO.

Ensure the major target is based on a *real*, current situation and is an achievable purpose.

7. Find out what the exact resources are for the area the Op will be implemented in and what the capabilities are of your terminals implementing the Op.

8. Keep the targets in an operation simple, yet complete.

9. Analyze properly the actual situation with the WHO and what the best line of attack should be done by the GO as a whole. It may be necessary to suggest that PR or Legal do some specific action as a finishing off of the WHO. Never wait for another bureau to handle a WHO, as Ops is responsible and has the capabilities to handle WHO's totally without the other Bureaus in the GO. Liaison though is very important with the various GO bureaus, specifically the Legal Branch 2 (attack area of Legal) and PR Branch 1 (attack area of PR).

10. A believable source must be provided in an operation, thereby "filling the vacuum," so that Scientology isn't dubbed in as source of the attack. A1 Ops are planned in such a way that they in no way could be traced back to the Church.

11. Channels should be various and ever changing types of channel of attack, rather than sticking to one type of Op, such as an anonymous flyer that 3-P's a WHO.

12. Mentally follow-thru your plan and ensure all factors concerning security and workability are taken into account. It is a good idea to also take the enemy's viewpoint when working out your strategy in the operation.

Once the plan is fully targeted out, CSW with full complete data your operation to the Dir Br1 US. When it is approved, then the Ops plan and the applicable data is flowed to Ops execution part of the Ops section.
Ops Execution Ops execution implements the targeted-out approved operation. If an AGI in the field is to receive the targeted plan or orders to do a part of the operation then this is routed in the following manner:

Branch 1 Director US DG I US Ops mail line AGI _______ _________________ OPS OFF US The "Ops mail line" is a point where the Ops targets are mailed directly on a confidential line directly to the Ops terminal in the field. (See the attached Ops Write-up 1R and the attached write-up of the US Ops Com-Lines) Flexibility is important when doing a targeted out plan. An operation should not be done robotically, as at times an Operation can be found to be unworkable for any number of different reasons. As execution observes the PT scenes of the Op and obtains feedback, it may be more applicable to re-CSW new actions or alter targets because of threat of exposure of the Op, etc.

Execution gets the Operation implemented and acts as Ops programmes officer, 8-Cing Ops units to get the necessary targets done and debugging bogged targets. Execution works very close to planning in that the necessary PT scene of the Op with feedback of the results is immediately infoed to Ops planning, so new channels can be drawn up or revised as necessary.

Ops execution ensures that the stat and report lines are in from his Ops units implementing the operation. (Ops Write-up 2R and 3 attached)

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