Blackmun, J. -- Opinion of the Court



[*116] MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.



This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, post,

p. 179, present constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion

legislation. The Texas statutes under attack here are typical of those that

have been in effect in many States for approximately a century. The Georgia

statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast and are a legislative product

that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent

attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of

new thinking about an old issue.



We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional

nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even

among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that

the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure

to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's

attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards

one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to

color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.



In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones

tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem.



Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement,

free of emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and,

because we do, we [*117] have inquired into, and in this opinion place some

emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history

reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the

centuries. We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his

now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905):



"[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views,

and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or

novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the

question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of

the United States."







The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the

State's Penal Code.(1) These make it a crime to "procure an abortion," as

therein [*118] defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to "an

abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving

the life of the mother." Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of

the States.(2)



[*119] Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. Texas Laws

1854 c. 49, § 1, set forth in 3 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1502 (1898).

This was soon modified into language that has remained substantially

unchanged to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of 1857, c. 7 Arts.

531-536; G. Paschal, Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192-2197 (1866); Texas Rev.

Stat., c. 8, Arts. 536-541 (1879); Texas Rev. Crim. Stat., Arts. 1071-1076

(1911). The final article in each of these compilations provided the same

exception, as does the present Article 1196, for an abortion by "medical

advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."(3)[*120]



II



Jane Roe,(4) a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas,

instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney

of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal

abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction

restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.



Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to

terminate her pregnancy by an abortion "performed by a competent, licensed

physician, under safe clinical conditions"; that she was unable to get a

"legal" abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened

by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to

travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under

safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were

unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal

privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe purported to sue "on

behalf of herself and all other women" similarly situated.



James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave

to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been

arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and

[*121] that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described

conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed

that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether

they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He

alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and

his patients' rights to privacy in the doctor- patient relationship and his

own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the

First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.



John and Mary Doe,(5) a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that

of Roe. They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like

constitutional deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Does alleged that they were a childless couple; that Mrs. Doe was

suffering from a "neuralchemical" disorder; that her physician had "advised

her to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition has materially

improved" (although a pregnancy at the present time would not present "a

serious risk" to her life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had

discontinued use of birth control pills; and that if she should become

pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion

performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe, clinical

conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported to sue

"on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated."



The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened

three-judge district court. The suits thus presented the situations of the

pregnant single woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant,

[*122] and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the attack on

the Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon the filing of affidavits,

motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held

that Roe and members of her class, and Dr. Hallford, had standing to sue

and presented justiciable controversies, but that the Does had failed to

allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have

standing. It concluded that, with respect to the requests for a declaratory

judgment, abstention was not warranted. On the merits, the District Court

held that the "fundamental right of single women and married persons to

choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment,

through the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the Texas criminal abortion

statutes were void on their face because they were both unconstitutionally

vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth

Amendment rights. The court then held that abstention was warranted with

respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the Does'

complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed the

application for injunctive relief. 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (ND Tex. 1970).



The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford, pursuant to 28 U.

S. C. § 1253, have appealed to this Court from that part of the

District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District

Attorney has purported to cross-appeal, pursuant to the same statute, from

the court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Both sides

also have taken protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance

pending decision here. We postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing

on the merits. 402 U.S. 941 (1971). [*123]



III



It might have been preferable if the defendant, pursuant to our Rule 20,

had presented to us a petition for certiorari before judgment in the Court

of Appeals with respect to the granting of the plaintiffs' prayer for

declaratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427

(1970), and Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U.S. 383 (1970), are to the

effect that § 1253 does not authorize an appeal to this Court from the

grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude, nevertheless,

that those decisions do not foreclose our review of both the injunctive and

the declaratory aspects of a case of this kind when it is properly here, as

this one is, on appeal under § 1253 from specific denial of injunctive

relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are necessarily identical. See

Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Florida Lime Growers v.

Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 80-81 (1960). It would be destructive of time and

energy for all concerned were we to rule otherwise. Cf. Doe v. Bolton,

post, p. 179.



IV



We are next confronted with issues of justiciability, standing, and

abstention. Have Roe and the Does established that "personal stake in the

outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), that

insures that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an

adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial

resolution," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968), and Sierra Club v.

Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972)? And what effect did the pendency of

criminal abortion charges against Dr. Hallford in state court have upon the

propriety of the federal court's granting relief to him as a

plaintiff-intervenor? [*124]



A. Jane Roe. Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is made that

Roe is a fictitious person. For purposes of her case, we accept as true,

and as established, her existence; her pregnant state, as of the inception

of her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 of that year when she filed

an alias affidavit with the District Court; and her inability to obtain a

legal abortion in Texas.



Viewing Roe's case as of the time of its filing and thereafter until as

late as May, there can be little dispute that it then presented a case or

controversy and that, wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a

pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws, had

standing to challenge those statutes. Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125

(CA2 1971); Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833, 838-839 (CA6 1971); Poe

v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990-991 (Kan. 1972). See Truax v. Raich, 239

U.S. 33 (1915). Indeed, we do not read the appellee's brief as really

asserting anything to the contrary. The "logical nexus between the status

asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.,

at 102, and the necessary degree of contentiousness, Golden v. Zwickler,

394 U.S. 103 (1969), are both present.



The appellee notes, however, that the record does not disclose that Roe was

pregnant at the time of the District Court hearing on May 22, 1970,(6) or

on the following June 17 when the court's opinion and judgment were filed.

And he suggests that Roe's case must now be moot because she and all other

members of her class are no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy. [*125]



The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at

stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the

action is initiated. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36

(1950); Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC v. Medical Committee for Human

Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).



But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the

normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will

come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that

termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive

much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively

denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than

once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to

survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic

justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be "capable

of repetition, yet evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC,

219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969);

Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-179 (1968); United States v. W.

T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-633 (1953).



We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to

undertake this litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy,

and that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her case

moot.



B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is different. He entered Roe's

litigation as a plaintiff- intervenor, alleging in his complaint that he:



     "[I]n the past has been arrested for violating the Texas Abortion

     Laws and at the present time stands charged by indictment with

     violating said laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas

     County, Texas to-wit: (1) The State of Texas vs. James H.

     Hallford, No. C-69-5307-IH, and (2) The State of Texas vs. [*126]

     James H. Hallford, No. C-69-2524-H. In both cases the defendant

     is charged with abortion ...."



In his application for leave to intervene, the doctor made like

representations as to the abortion charges pending in the state court.

These representations were also repeated in the affidavit he executed and

filed in support of his motion for summary judgment.



Dr. Hallford is, therefore, in the position of seeking, in a federal court,

declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the same statutes under

which he stands charged in criminal prosecutions simultaneously pending in

state court. Although he stated that he has been arrested in the past for

violating the State's abortion laws, he makes no allegation of any

substantial and immediate threat to any federally protected right that

cannot be asserted in his defense against the state prosecutions. Neither

is there any allegation of harassment or bad-faith prosecution. In order to

escape the rule articulated in the cases cited in the next paragraph of

this opinion that, absent harassment and bad faith, a defendant in a

pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively challenge in federal court

the statutes under which the State is prosecuting him, Dr. Hallford seeks

to distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his status as a

"potential future defendant" and to assert only the latter for standing

purposes here.



We see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in Samuels v. Mackell,

401 U. S. 66 (1971), compels the conclusion that the District Court erred

when it granted declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford instead of refraining

from so doing. The court, of course, was correct in refusing to grant

injunctive relief to the doctor. The reasons supportive of that action,

however, are those expressed in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, and in Younger

v. [*127] Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77

(1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401

U. S. 216 (1971). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We

note, in passing, that Younger and its companion cases were decided after

the three-judge District Court decision in this case.



Dr. Hallford's complaint in intervention, therefore, is to be dismissed.(7)

He is remitted to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings against

him. We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted

Dr. Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in intervention.



C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe's standing in her case, the

issue of the Does' standing in their case has little significance. The

claims they assert are essentially the same as those of Roe, and they

attack the same statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly note the Does' posture.



Their [*128] pleadings present them as a childless married couple, the

woman not being pregnant, who have no desire to have children at this time

because of their having received medical advice that Mrs. Doe should avoid

pregnancy, and for "other highly personal reasons." But they "fear . . .

they may face the prospect of becoming parents." And if pregnancy ensues,

they "would want to terminate" it by an abortion. They assert an inability

to obtain an abortion legally in Texas and, consequently, the prospect of

obtaining an illegal abortion there or of going outside Texas to some place

where the procedure could be obtained legally and competently.



We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have, as their asserted

immediate and present injury, only an alleged "detrimental effect upon

[their] marital happiness" because they are forced to "the choice of

refraining from normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary Doe's health

through a possible pregnancy." Their claim is that sometime in the future

Mrs. Doe might become pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive

measures, and at that time in the future she might want an abortion that

might then be illegal under the Texas statutes.



This very phrasing of the Does' position reveals its speculative character.

Their alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure,

possible future pregnancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood,

and possible future impairment of health. Any one or more of these several

possibilities may not take place and all may not combine. In the Does'

estimation, these possibilities might have some real or imagined impact

upon their marital happiness. But we are not prepared to say that the bare

allegation of so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual case

or controversy. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 41-42; Golden v. Zwickler,

394 U. S., at 109-110; Abele v. Markle, 452 F. 2d, at 1124-1125; Crossen v.

Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d, at 839. The Does' claim falls far short of those

resolved otherwise in the cases that the Does urge upon us, namely,

Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617 (1971); Data Processing

Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970); [*129] and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393

U. S. 97 (1968). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915).



The Does therefore are not appropriate plaintiffs in this litigation. Their

complaint was properly dismissed by the District Court, and we affirm that

dismissal.



[Next section of opinion]

[Case overview (Syllabus)]



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     "Article 1191. Abortion "If any person shall designedly

     administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to be

     administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use

     towards her any violence or means whatever externally or

     internally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be

     confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five

     years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be

     doubled. By `abortion' is meant that the life of the fetus or

     embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature

     birth thereof be caused.



     "Art. 1192. Furnishing the means "Whoever furnishes the means for

     procuring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as

     an accomplice.



     "Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion



     "If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the

     offender is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce

     abortion, provided it be shown that such means were calculated to

     produce that result, and shall be fined not less than one hundred

     nor more than one thousand dollars.



     "Art. 1194. Murder in producing abortion



     "If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so

     produced or by an attempt to effect the same it is murder."



     "Art. 1196. By medical advice



     "Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or

     attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of

     the mother."



The foregoing Articles, together with Art. 1195, compose Chapter 9 of Title

15 of the Penal Code. Article 1195, not attacked here, reads:



     "Art. 1195. Destroying unborn child



     "Whoever shall during parturition of the mother destroy the

     vitality or life in a child in a state of being born and before

     actual birth, which child would otherwise have been born alive,

     shall be confined in the penitentiary for life or for not less

     than five years."



[Return to text]



2 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-211 (1956); Conn. Pub. Act No. 1 (May

1972 special session) (in 4 Conn. Leg. Serv. 677 (1972)), and Conn. Gen.

Stat. Rev. §§ 53-29, 53- 30 (1968) (or unborn child); Idaho Code

§ 18-601 (1948); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 23-1 (1971); Ind. Code

§ 35-1-58-1 (1971); Iowa Code § 701.1 (1971); Ky. Rev. Stat.

§ 436.020 (1962); La. Rev. Stat. § 37:1285(6) (1964) (loss of

medical license) (but see § 14:87 (Supp. 1972) containing no exception

for the life of the mother under the criminal statute); Me. Rev. Stat.

Ann., Tit. 17, § 51 (1964); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 272, § 19

(1970) (using the term "unlawfully," construed to exclude an abortion to

save the mother's life, Kudish v. Bd. of Registration, 356 Mass. 98, 248

N.E.2d 264 (1969)); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.14 (1948); Minn. Stat.

§ 617.18 (1971); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.100 (1969); Mont. Rev.

Codes Ann. § 94-401 (1969); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-405 (1964); Nev.

Rev. Stat. § 200.220 (1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 585:13

(1955); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:87-1 (1969) ("without lawful

justification"); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12- 25-01, 12-25-02 (1960);

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.16 (1953); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21,

§ 861 (1972- 1973 Supp.); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §§ 4718,

4719 (1963) ("unlawful"); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-3-1 (1969); S.D.

Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-17-1 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-301,

39-302 (1956); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-1, 76-2-2 (1953); Vt. Stat.

Ann., Tit. 13, § 101 (1958); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-2-8 (1966);

Wis. Stat. § 940.04 (1969); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-77, 6-78

(1957). [Return to text]



3 Long ago, a suggestion was made that the Texas statutes were

unconstitutionally vague because of definitional deficiencies. The Texas

Court of Crimmal Appeals disposed of that suggestion peremptorily, saying

only,



     "It is also insisted in the motion in arrest of judgment that the

     statute is unconstitutional and void in that it does not

     sufficiently define or describe the offense of abortion. We do

     not concur in respect to this question." Jackson v. State, 55

     Tex. Cr. R. 79, 89, 115 S.W. 262, 268 (1908).



The same court recently has held again that the State's abortion statutes

are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Thompson v. State (Ct. Crim.

App. Tex. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1200. The court held that "the

State of Texas has a compelling interest to protect fetal life"; that Art.

1191 "is designed to protect fetal life"; that the Texas homicide statutes,

particularly Art. 1205 of the Penal Code, are intended to protect a person

"in existence by actual birth" and thereby implicitly recognize other human

life that is not "in existence by actual birth"; that the definition of

human life is for the legislature and not the courts; that Art. 1196 "is

more definite than the District of Columbia statute upheld in [United

States v.] Vuitch" (402 U.S. 62); and that the Texas statute "is not vague

and indefinite or overbroad." A physician's abortion conviction vras

affirmed.



In Thompson, n. 2, the court observed that any issue as to the burden of

proof under the exemption of Art. 1196 "is not before us." But see Veevers

v. State, 172 Tex. Cr. R. 162, 168-169, 354 S.W.2d 161, 166-167 (1962). Cf.

United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 69- 71 (1971). [Return to text]



4 The name is a pseudonym. [Return to text]



5 These names are pseudonyms. [Return to text]



6 The appellee twice states in his brief that the hearing before the

District Court was held on July 22, 1970. Brief for Appellee 13. The docket

entries, App. 2, and the transcript, App. 76, reveal this to be an error.

The July date appears to be the time of the reporter's transcription. See

App. 77. [Return to text]



7 We need not consider what different result, if any, would follow if Dr.

Hallford's intervention were on behalf of a class. His complaint in

intervention does not purport to assert a class suit and makes no reference

to any class apart from an allegation that he "and others similarly

situated" must necessarily guess at the meaning of Art. 1196. His

application for leave to intervene goes somewhat further, for it asserts

that plaintiff Roe does not adequately protect the interest of the doctor

"and the class of people who are physicians ... [and] the class of people

who are ... patients ...."



The leave application, however, is not the complaint. Despite the District

Court's statement to the contrary, 314 F. Supp., at 1225, we fail to

perceive the essentials of a class suit in the Hallford complaint. [Return

to text]