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From: Robert S. Minton <bob@minton.org>
Subject: Opposition to Minton's Motion to Quash 2/4
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2001 13:35:28 -0500
Message-ID: <er8f1ug2crbldc0rkd8l3hqv9os8h5u92h@4ax.com>
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT ESTATE OF LISA MCPHERSON, ) by and through the Personal ) Representative, DELL LIEBREICH, ) Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: 01-4612 H Request for Hearing v. ) ) CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG ) SERVICE ORGANIZATION, ) Defendant. ) OPPOSITION TO ROBERT MINTON'S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS DIRECTED TO FLEETBOSTON AND FIDELITY BANK Defendant in the underlying foreign?state action, Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization (the "Church"), herewith opposes the Motion to Quash Subpoenas Directed to FleetBoston Financial Corporation and Fidelity Investments, Inc. by Robert Minton, for the reasons set forth below:
I. INTRODUCTION As noted by Mr. Minton, he is not a party to the underlying Florida action pending in the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County, Case No.:
005682?CI?11, (the "Underlying Case"). For several years, however, Mr.
Minton has paid all of the plaintiff's fees and costs, paid all of the witnesses, made unlawful and tortious payments to fact witnesses, and made improper payments to purported expert witnesses. He has hired people to engage in public and vitriolic demonstrations at the defendant's Church, and has generally controlled the litigation through his investments, payments and employees hired as "consultants" to plaintiff's counsel.
His interest in the Underlying Case may well include antireligious philosophic reasons as he argues, but his more manifest interest is purely financial: in exchange for the millions of dollars pumped into the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff has agreed to provide Mr. Minton's for?profit corporation with, as Minton himself has characterized it, "the vast majority of any settlement or award from trial."
Minton's payments and improper and tortious activity in the Underlying Case have resulted in the Church's filing of a counterclaim for abuse of process under Florida law. Mr. Minton and his for profit company the Lisa McPherson Trust, Inc. ("LMT"), are both identified as co?conspirators in the counterclaim ? which pleading has withstood a motion to dismiss and is scheduled for trial in June of 2002.
Although many orders have issued from the Florida court requiring testimony and the production of financial records from Minton relating to these matters, Minton has contumaciously evaded such orders. Notwithstanding 3 different monetary sanctions orders against him in the Underlying Case alone, Minton faces potential contempt of court for his refusal to respond to questions and for his destruction of evidence.
Indeed, it is solely because of Minton's intransigence that third party bank discovery has been sought. This is because Minton has now asserted a Fifth Amendment self?incrimination privilege to refuse to reveal details regarding his payments to plaintiff's counsel, payoffs to witnesses, laundering funds through his Florida corporation to pay witnesses and counsel, and coordination of such matters with plaintiff's counsel. Worse, he has admittedly destroyed financial records subject to the discovery orders.
Minton's assertions that the discovery is for an ulterior purpose, and his other inflammatory allegations are simply untrue and intended to invoke religious prejudice or otherwise avoid the simplicity of what is happening here: Minton has destroyed records and refused to provide evidence central to issues in a case in which he has invested and in which he paid off witnesses. The defendant Church necessarily therefore seeks the financial proof of this misconduct and control of the Underlying Case by a third party 2 investor. The discovery here sought has been argued before the Florida court and authorized by the presiding court, and it is directly relevant to the issues in the Underlying Case and necessary for the resolution of issues herein in light of Minton's destruction of evidence.
The motion should accordingly be denied and attorneys' fees awarded to defendant Church.
II. BACKGROUND HISTORY A. Minton's Role in this Case The Underlying Case is a wrongful death action, concerning the 1995 death of Lisa McPherson following her stay at a Church of Scientology in Clearwater, Florida.
Mr. Minton's unsupported assertions that he has no role in that case are flatly refuted by evidence of record in that action. Starting after the case was filed in 1997, Robert Minton began making investments in the litigation. Minton had no connection of any sort with the Scientology religion or any of the actors in the case, but allegedly became interested in the case through the Internet.
Mr. Minton thereafter retained plaintiff's counsel, Kennan Dandar, to incorporate the for?profit company LMT, (Ex. 1), to receive the hoped?for proceeds of the action. Mr. Minton was the sole shareholder and therefore appointed himself the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the corporation. (Ex. 2, Minton Depo., May 18, 2000, pp. 18?19.)
Robert Minton is a financial investor in the Underlying Case. His investments in payments to the beneficiaries of the plaintiff estate, his investments in payments to plaintiff's counsel, and his direct payments to witnesses and payments via LMT for inflammatory testimony, are business expenses. Mr. Minton has stated that he expects the end result of the case to be a $100 million award. (Ex. 3.) Thus, Minton's estimated $4?5 million investment in the case and 3 efforts to influence the jury pool is simply an investment for what he expects to produce a substantial return. Evidence regarding the deal made between plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Minton and plaintiff Dell Liebreich regarding receipt of funds from Minton and the distribution of hoped?for recovery includes the following:
o In 1998, Mr. Minton testified that he "suggested" to Plaintiff's counsel, Kennan Dandar, that plaintiff Dell Liebreich agree to donate the "bulk" of any hoped?for recovery to a "cult awareness type organization."
(Ex. 4, Minton Depo., January 13, 1998, pp. 64?65.) Mr. Minton testified that Mr. Dandar told Minton that Ms. Liebreich agreed to such an arrangement. (Id., p. 65.)
o In deposition, Mr. Minton agreed with the characterization of the money paid to plaintiff's counsel as his "piece of the litigation." (Id., p. 47.)
o Ms. Liebreich's testimony affirmed the existence of the agreement.
(Ex. 5, Liebreich Depo., May 24, 1999, pp. 198?199.)
o Ms. Liebreich's sister, Ann Carlson, who is also a beneficiary of the plaintiff estate, testified that it was the Lisa McPherson Trust that they intended to receive the settlement funds. (Ex. 6, Carlson Depo., July 27, 2000, p. 225.)
o In a February 2000 message Mr. Minton posted to an Internet group critical of the Scientology religion, he also stated, "The family of Lisa McPherson has given us their full support and, as you know, promised to give the vast majority of any settlement or award from trial to The Lisa McPherson Trust. Obviously ... that money will not be forthcoming for a very long time . ... And, when that money comes, The Lisa McPherson Trust ... will ... be forever endowed." (Ex. 7.) (Emphasis added.)
o On a radio show in January of 2000, Mr. Minton described his investment in this litigation and his expected gain on that investment:
I've spent three million dollars of my own money, and the principal case which I'm involved in, which the Scientologists seem to hate me most for, is the civil lawsuit brought by the family of Lisa McPherson ... And, the family, who I've been supporting in this civil lawsuit, have agreed that, when and if they prevail against the Church of Scientology in this lawsuit, that they will donate a very substantial amount of the proceeds of that lawsuit to this organization called the Lisa McPherson Trust. (Ex. 8, Transcript, authenticated at deposition; Ex. 9, Minton Depo., May 24, 2000, pp. 391?392.)
Mr. Minton has also given Mr. Dandar's purported "expert 4 witnesses" and "consultants" Jesse Prince, Vaughn Young, and Stacy Brooks substantial funds, European vacations, cars, houses and credit cards in a total amount yet to be determined, but also believed to be far in excess of an additional million dollars. Mr. Minton admitted that he paid plaintiff's "expert" Jesse Prince at least $15,000 in 1998, $14?18,000 in 1999 (Id., p.
327), and in 2000, at least $50,000. (Id., pp. 285?286.) Minton also purchased a house for $247,000 for Brooks and her then?husband, Vaughn Young (Ex. 10), and gave them $50,000 in cash. (Ex. 4, pp. 41?42.) During this period, these witnesses provided fact affidavits for plaintiff's counsel which were filed in the underlying action, and Mr. Dandar has identified Ms. Brooks both as plaintiff's "expert" witness (Ex. 11), and also as a purported "consultant." (Ex. 12.)
Mr. Minton has also paid at least $10,000?15,000 to an antireligious "deprogramming" center in rural Ohio called Wellspring (Ex. 9, pp.
300?301), that advertises itself as a "residential treatment facility." The money paid by Minton was for the purpose of "counseling" several of plaintiff's witnesses, including Brooks, Young, Prince and plaintiff's witness Karsten Lorenzen, immediately before they gave testimony or affidavits to plaintiff's counsel ?testimony that was always irrelevant but highly derogatory and inflammatory after their "counseling" on how they should perceive their lives in their former religion as a "cultic"
experience.
Mr. Minton also paid all of the expenses of LMT and its several employees, who engaged in regular and virulent "demonstrations" regarding the Underlying Case outside the premises of the Church in Clearwater.
The plaintiff, Dell Liebreich, on the other hand, plays no perceptible role in the litigation. She lives in Texas and admitted that she did not know her niece Lisa McPherson very well, was not on good terms with her, and had not even spoken to her for some 4?6 years 5 prior to her death in 1995. (Ex. 13, Liebreich Depo., May 16, 1997, p. 51.)
Ms. Liebreich has apparently abdicated her responsibility and control of the Underlying Case to Mr. Minton, who holds the purse strings for plaintiff's counsel, for unlawful payoffs to his witnesses and the substantial media machinery and demonstrations of paid picketers.
After hearing several days of deposition of LMT's President and Mr. Minton, in response to an objection from Minton's counsel regarding the relevance of a question at his deposition, discovery Judge Robert Beach, who attended the deposition, explained his reasoning for overruling the objection:
[The question at issue] tends to show the motive of Mr. Minton, both on behalf of himself and on behalf of the trust, and the bad blood he has; his involvement in this case ?
It's hard to distinguish the trust, Mr. Minton and the plaintiff in this case. They're so intertwined, as a matter of fact, it almost appears that Lisa McPherson has been overshadowed by the activities of the trust and Mr.
Minton in pursuing this case against the Scientologists. That's the way it appears to me...
I'm just telling you how it appears it's developing to me; that Mr. Minton and the trust seem to have as great a interest in the outcome of this case as the estate of Lisa McPherson has. (Ex. 14, Minton Depo., September 18 &
19, 2001, pp. 221?223.)
B. Orders Requiring Discovery from Minton Mr. Minton's role as investor in the underlying action and the payments to fact witnesses and under?the?counter payments to expert witnesses, are significant issues in the Underlying Case. Since 1997, discovery orders have been issued requiring Minton's monetary involvement in the Underlying Case to be revealed. And in the last several years, Minton and LMT have refused to comply with these discovery orders and have destroyed resources with frivolous and delaying litigation, such as the instant motion to quash. At the time of his original deposition on January 13, 1998, Mr.
6 Minton had given plaintiff's counsel $100,000. Thereafter it became public knowledge that Minton was making further substantial payments to fund the Underlying Case. The plaintiff resisted the Church's written discovery requests that were designed to ascertain the precise amounts and dates of these payments. Ultimately, the Florida Court twice ordered plaintiff to produce documents relating to Mr. Minton's funding of the Underlying Case.
(Exs. 15, 16.)
Minton asserted numerous and varied objections to providing discovery relating to his escalating role in the Underlying Case: relevance, harassment, attorney?work product, overbreadth, and privacy. These objections were rejected by the Florida court and Minton was again ordered into deposition. (Ex. 17.) The deposition of Mr. Minton resumed on May 24, 2000. Mr. Minton provided some testimony, including the fact that he had given Plaintiff's counsel $1.05 million as of that date, and had made payments to some of the witnesses. He refused, however, to answer many questions and he did not produce a single document in response to the subpoena served upon him pursuant to the Florida court's authorization.
Instead, he testified that he had not had an opportunity to search for the financial documents and other records at his New Hampshire home where they would be located (Ex. 9, pp. 215?216), but promised to search before his deposition was resumed on the agreed upon date of June 20, 2000. (Id., pp.
445?446.) Mr. Minton violated agreements to appear or to produce the documents in June, August and September 2000. Finally, it was agreed that Minton's deposition would take place on September 18, 2000; however, Minton failed to show, and a new motion to compel was filed.
An Order dated November 20, 2000, required Mr. Minton to appear on December 13, 2000 for his deposition, (Ex. 18) and sanctions were also issued for the months of obstruction and refusal to answer 7 appropriate questions. (Ex. 19.) Minton again failed to appear for his deposition, and after lengthy litigation over the scope of the deposition, relevance and privacy objections, Minton was again ordered to appear for deposition by memorandum decision dated January 10, 2001, (Ex. 20), and was again sanctioned. (Ex. 21.)
Despite orders and sanctions, Minton again refused to appear, and he filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Florida Court of Appeals and a motion to stay discovery, asserting privacy privileges in the records and testimony at issue. (Ex. 22.) Based on such assertions, the Court of Appeals stayed the discovery until July 13, 2001, when it lifted the stay and dismissed the petition, (Ex. 23), thus tacitly rejecting the very same privacy arguments made in the instant motion.
Thus, Mr. Minton was finally ordered to respond to many questions he had answered only in part, avoided or evaded over the past several years.
However, at his September 18?19, 2001 deposition, Mr. Minton asserted a Fifth Amendment claim to decline to reveal his payments to plaintiff, payments to the beneficiaries of the plaintiff estate, payments to plaintiff's counsel, payments to expert witnesses, payments to fact witnesses and payments to influence the jury pool.
(Ex. 14, pp. 35, 41, 47, 128, 129, 152?154, 160?162, 179?181, 185?187, 226, 278?281, 294, 306.) Minton has also asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to reveal the ways and means money was "funneled"
(Minton's word) to his company, LMT. (Id., pp. 127?129, 137, 138.)
Most of Mr. Minton's Fifth Amendment claims have been rejected in Footnote 1) Of course, "In a civil action, a reasonable inference adverse to a party may be drawn from the refusal of that party to testify on grounds of self?incrimination." Labor Relations Commission v. Fall River Educators' Association, 382 Mass. 465, 471, 416 N.E.2d 1340 (1981); See also, Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 305?306, 249 N.E.2d 583 (1969); Baxter v. Palmi iq ano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976).
8 a written order by the Florida court, and he was again sanctioned.
(Ex. 24.) Of course, he has also asserted an intention to appeal that ruling and thus refuses to abide by the Florida court's ruling to testify as to his financing and payoffs in the Underlying Case.
Significantly, at his May 2000 deposition held in Florida, where Minton registered the LMT corporation, Minton also testified that he possessed financial records relating to his payments to plaintiff's counsel and plaintiff's witnesses. (Ex. 9, pp. 215, 216, 328.) However, in September 2001, when asked to produce the financial materials at his deposition, Minton asserted that during the intervening months while he was pulling out all stops litigating in an attempt to prevent discovery, he had destroyed all of his financial records. (Ex. 14, pp. 4?6.)
Moreover, at his deposition in the related case of Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization v. Liebreich, Case No.: 00?2750CI?20, also pending in the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County, Minton was asked if he would contact his bank and request copies of the records, which he had destroyed. He refused. (Ex. 25.)
It is this destruction of evidence and assertion of Fifth Amendment claims that necessitated seeking records from his banks as perhaps the only remaining source of discovery.
III. Mr. Minton's Legal Arguments Are Without Merit There are substantial issues in the Underlying Case relating to the payment of fact witnesses by Mr. Minton and his company, and control of the litigation by a third party investor which require full and open disclosure. Pretending he is some sort of avenging freedom fighter against a religion he derides with false and inflammatory allegations, Minton argues he is being victimized through invasive discovery. Minton thus fails to inform this Court of the many orders requiring him to produce records and testify about the matters he now 9 asserts, again, are "irrelevant" or "private."
Despite numerous rulings from the court in Florida, Minton has obstructed discovery, destroyed evidence and disobeyed unequivocal orders.
A. The Procedure Herein Was Appropriate Mr. Minton asserts that the subpoenas were issued without considering the merits of Mr. Minton's objections. In fact, these identical arguments have been rejected time and again by the Florida court and even the Florida Court of Appeals. The Florida court has repeatedly found it appropriate to require Minton and his company to reveal payments made to parties, counsel and witnesses in the Underlying Case. (See Exs. 17, 18, 20, 24, 26?32.)
The argument that he was not given notice is ridiculous. Minton's Florida counsel was consulted as to the dates of the depositions, and said merely to notice them because a motion for protective order would be filed when noticed. (Ex. 33, Affidavit of Kendrick Moxon). Indeed, the reason the instant motion was filed was because Minton was given notice of the time and place of the deposition in exactly the same fashion he would have been given notice in any Massachusetts case. (Ex. 34, Affidavit of Brian D.
Gross.) Moreover, as Minton concedes, his Florida counsel also objected to the issuance of the subpoenas in Massachusetts and the objection was overruled. As Minton litigates every single discovery issue to the very last breath and then some, it was understood by all counsel and the Florida court that he would do the same here and would seek to relitigate what he repeatedly lost in Florida.
Moreover, the banks each indicated that they would provide notice to Minton prior to production in order to permit him an opportunity to object, (Ex.
34), and a time period for this inevitable objection was factored into the deposition notice. Thus, the assertion of lack of 10 notice is disingenuous.
B. No Overriding Right to Privacy Prevents Disclosure Of Records of a Financial Institution FleetBank and Fidelity Investments were subpoenaed because they were two of the banks known to be used by Minton to make payments to plaintiff's counsel. (Exs. 35 and 36.) Massachusetts courts allow broad discovery of any matter that is relevant to the pending action. Under Massachusetts law, a requesting party is entitled to obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party. Mass. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(1999); see Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun.
Wholesale Elec. Co., 414 Mass. 609, 615 (1993). Relevancy for purposes of discovery has been defined broadly. The guiding principles were set forth by the Supreme Judicial Court as follows:
The United States Supreme Court has defined relevancy under Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1), the parallel rule to Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 365 Mass. 772 (1974), "broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. See, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). Consistently with the notice?pleading system established by the Rules, discovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues. Id. at 500?501. Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of factoriented issues may arise during litigation that are not related to the merits."
Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 534 (1984) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). Therefore, the Church is entitled to the requested discovery from F1eetBoston and Fidelity as long as the information requested is relevant to the Underlying Case. Minton argues that Massachusetts's law regards a bank customer's 11 financial records to be confidential, and prohibits disclosure. As a general rule this is true. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 167B § 16. The Legislature, however, has carved out an exception that allows disclosure of bank account information pursuant to a court order or a lawful subpoena.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 167B § 16(a)(4).
Mr. Minton's sole authority referenced, the unreported decision in Commonwealth v. Source One Associates, Inc., 1999 WL 975120 (Mass. Super.
1999), simply addresses the impropriety of disclosure of financial records through subterfuge, not pursuant to a lawful subpoena as here. Indeed, Minton concedes that disclosure of financial records is prohibited "unless the bank is required to do so by subpoena." (Motion at 7.)
Consequently, the Church is entitled to discovery of the records in the possession of F1eetBoston and Fidelity concerning payments made by Minton to the plaintiff or plaintiff's agents or counsel or witnesses in the Underlying Case or monies received by Minton from others for that same purpose because they are relevant to its counterclaim for abuse of process.
C. Request No. 1 is Appropriate and Authorized The subpoena has also been carefully limited to be tailored solely to the issues in the Underlying Case and as to disclosures of information relating to the witnesses and parties therein. While defendant theoretically could have requested all of the financial records of these banks, it made specific limitations to the persons and issues in this case. Minton's assertion that the persons listed in the subpoena for whom disclosures are requested are beyond the scope of the order is wrong, and knowingly so.
Thus, as demanded by Minton, the Church here provides the identifying information for each of the persons on this list as counsel, party or witness, to demonstrate that discovery as to the extent to which Minton provided funds to each is appropriate. It should be first noted that whether 12 or not any person appears on the parties' "witness lists" is of little significance as a limitation on appropriate discovery. In May of 2000, the judge assigned to the Underlying Case set the case for trial in July of that year, and ordered the parties to file witness lists as of that time.
Since then, the trial date was vacated, and more than 80 depositions have been taken and considerable documentary discovery, which has obviously altered the scope of the issues in the case and the identities of the witnesses. The only usefulness of the May 2000 witness lists is to identify those uncontested witnesses.
Moreover, the Florida court has expanded the definition of a "witness" in the case, such expansion made necessary by Minton's argument which has been repeatedly rejected in Florida, and yet is repeated again here, that the only persons relevant to the case were those listed as witnesses 18 months ago. Obviously that is not the standard of relevance in Florida (which has largely adopted the language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), or in any other court in the United States. The Florida court's definition of witnesses is:
THE COURT: you know, my idea of a witness is someone that the Plaintiff says is a witness, or the Defendant says is a witness, or someone who has some knowledge about the case. So it's someone who's listed on a witness list plus other individuals that have not been listed yet. That's my idea of a witness in a case.
THE COURT: Right now a witness is a person listed in this case or someone who has knowledge plus someone who has knowledge of the facts in the most recent complaint.
(Ex. 37, Transcript of Proceedings, November 8, 2000, pp. 43?44, 45.)
A cursory statement of the relationship of each of the persons identified in the subpoena to this case (and therefore why it is relevant to know if they have received money from Minton or gave money 13 to Minton), includes parties, beneficiaries of the estate, and various types of witnesses, as follows:
Peter Alexander ? alleged fact witness deposed by defendant, and who provided an affidavit filed by plaintiff.
Wayne Andrews ? Clearwater police officer who investigated the death of Lisa McPherson and who met with plaintiff's counsel/provided documents to plaintiff's counsel.
Gerald Armstrong ? plaintiff's identified trial witness/deposed by plaintiff/Board member of Minton's company, LMT.
Stacy Brooks Young ? previously identified "expert witness" for plaintiff having supplied three affidavits utilized by plaintiff and "expert consultant" of plaintiff/paid other fact witnesses as the President of LMT, and testified she has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the Complaint.
Mark Bunker ? employee of LMT and eyewitness to many acts of intimidation of witnesses, and is identified as a witness in defendant's supplemental witness list of June 1, 2000.
Ursula Caberta ? adverse witness deposed by defendants/testified she was setting up a second LMT office/gave press conference for LMT in Clearwater, Florida including issues in the Underlying Case.
Ann Carlson ? Lisa McPherson's aunt and beneficiary of the plaintiff estate/also on plaintiff's witness list.
David Cecere ? former President of LMT and eyewitness to payoffs to fact witnesses and intimidation of witnesses.
Courage Production ? independent film company allegedly paid millions by Minton in Tampa, Florida to make derogatory movie relating to Scientology to poison jury pool/owned by plaintiff's witness, Peter Alexander.
Dandar & Dandar, ? plaintiff's counsel.
P.A.
Kennan Dandar ? plaintiff's counsel who negotiated deal with Minton and plaintiff to receive Minton's funds in exchange for proceeds of case.
Thomas Dandar ? plaintiff's counsel.
14 Kelly Davis ? plaintiff's identified witness.
Sam Davis ? uncle of Lisa McPherson and beneficiary of plaintiff estate/on Plaintiff's witness list.
Ray Emmons ? former Clearwater police officer hired as investigator who has intimidated witnesses.
Michael Garko ? plaintiff's counsel's "trial consultant."
Patricia Greenway ? co?producer with Peter Alexander of movie/witness.
Andreas Heldal?Lund? identified by Stacy Brooks as person who gave $300,000 to LMT which was subsequently given to Minton shortly before Minton gave $250,000 to plaintiff's counsel.' Keith Henson ? fugitive from California for conviction of hate crimes against Church/paid by Minton to demonstrate at Church/advisory Board member of LMT.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx ? witness deposed in this case/hired by Minton to harass Church/also employed by LMT in Clearwater.
Stephen Kent ? plaintiff's designated expert witness.
Kim Wilde ? Lisa McPherson's cousin/beneficiary of plaintiff estate.
Daniel Leipold ? plaintiff's designated witness.
Dell Liebreich ? plaintiff.
Lisa McPherson Trust, Inc. ? company designated to receive the hoped?for proceeds of the Underlying Case (see details above).
Paul Maser ? Clearwater police officer who investigated case.
Medical Cost Control and Management, Inc. ? company utilized by plaintiff's counsel to conduct factual investigations and conduct experiments in case.
Footnote 2 The court has issued separate orders relating to endeavors to acquire evidence from Heldal?Lund via letters rogatory. Heldal?Lund is a Norwegian citizen.
John Merrett ? counsel for several witnesses, including Jesse Prince, Stacy Brooks and Theresa Summers.
Operation Clambake? anti?religious entity in Norway that, according to LMT's President, gave $300,000 to LMT, later transferred to Minton shortly before Minton gave plaintiff's counsel $250,000.
Bob Peterson ? LMT employee and deposed witness in case/eyewitness to abuse of process.
Deneen Phillips ? LMT employee/deposed witness in case/eyewitness to abuse of process.
Duncan Pierce ? LMT Board member.
Jesse Prince ? on plaintiff's witness list/plaintiff's designated expert witness.
James Siegelman ? on plaintiff's witness list.
Lee Skelton ? on plaintiff's witness list/beneficiary of plaintiff estate.
Kathy Little ? beneficiary of plaintiff estate.
Jack Slaughter ? beneficiary of plaintiff estate.
Totally Fun Co. ? company owned by plaintiff's witness Peter Alexander/used to make movie intended to poison jury pool.
University of Alberta ? recipient of large payment from LMT as the employer of plaintiff's designated expert witness, Stephen Kent.
Grady Ward ? LMT employee/deposed witness in case/eyewitness to abuse of process.
Hana Whitfield ? on plaintiff's witness list/plaintiff's designated expert witness.
Vaughn Young? on plaintiff's witness list/plaintiff's designated expert witness D. Request No. 2 is Appropriate and Authorized The second document request seeks: "Any and all documents in your possession concerning receipt of funds from the Lisa McPherson Trust, Inc., Operation Clambake, Andreas Heldal?Lund, any Norwegian bank, any 16 German bank and Gerald Armstrong."
As noted above, LMT's President testified that $300,000 was given to LMT from "Operation Clambake," owned by Norwegian Andreas?HeldalLund (Ex. 38, Brooks Depo. as LMT Rep., August 15, 2001, pp. 29, 30, 37), and another $500,000 was given to LMT from an "anonymous" person from Germany. This money, after transfer to LMT, was then given by the corporation to Minton as payment of an alleged debt for which no contract or paperwork exists.
(Id., pp. 31?33.) If it were not suspicious enough that the President and CFO of the company has no written record of the debt but makes payments on the debt anyway, without any paperwork, it is equally curious that the money comes from an allegedly "anonymous" source. But it is not curiosity which drives this request. Rather, it is that large payments were made to witnesses in the case and to plaintiff's counsel by both Minton and LMT, shortly after these transfers from Norway or Germany were received.
The Florida court has specifically ruled that this information may be discovered and has issued an order requesting letters rogatory in Norway to assist the Church to acquire further information concerning this additional investor in the case. (Exs. 39 and 40.) And, in making his argument, Mr.
Minton fails to inform this Court that his attorney, John Merrett, already opposed the issuance of such orders in Florida and that after oral argument, the objections of Mr. Minton's attorney were rejected and the orders issued.
The presiding court in Florida has repeatedly ruled that the defendants are entitled to learn the source of the funds utilized to prosecute the Underlying Case against them through Minton's for?profit company, (Exs. 17, 18, 20, 24, 26?32), and indeed, who may be the real party in interest as the plaintiff in this action.
These funds have been utilized in the abuse of process central to 17 the counterclaim for payoffs to witnesses and control of the case run by financial investors who have de facto control of the action.
E. Minton's Scurrilous Allegations Should Be Stricken or Disregarded For the past several years that Minton has invested in the Underlying Case, paid witnesses, and asserted a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to divulge evidence regarding other illegal acts relating to his involvement therein, he has repeated a refrain that it is really he that is the victim.
His alleged reasons for making these investments ? that he is "concerned"
for how the Church treats its own members, or is merely trying to produce a "fairer fight," should be viewed with some skepticism. He is an investor.
He is trying to make money on the case. This a business deal, and he has announced that he believes the case is worth $100 million. Thus, as an investor, he is trying to make a profit.
Minton's mere affidavit consisting of his own false assertions and double and triple hearsay should be disregarded. Defendant will not engage in an item by item refutation, but to say the assertions of harassment are false and outrageous. The sole issues addressed that are factual, concern counter?demonstrations by members of the Scientology religion who, disgusted with Minton's activities, have exercised a First Amendment right to speak their minds as Minton has so often exercised himself to deride the Scientology religion.
But those persons are not the defendants in this case or the Underlying Case, and there is not even an allegation that the defendants in this case or the Underlying Case have stated or done 18 anything about which Minton complains. And, the exercise of First Amendment rights of a group of persons attacked by Minton to defend themselves or to reveal Minton as the hidden source of the attacks against their religion is hardly a legal, factual, or appropriate basis to deny the discovery sought.
For example, Minton complains that it was revealed that he paid off an anti?religious hate group $25,000 that thereafter gave him an award as their hero. However, that financial information was a matter of public record in the Florida case, having been filed in papers therein and was not remotely private or privileged.
Moreover, the several cases cited by Minton for the proposition that some other church of Scientology was criticized in the past, or that a judge once took a part of an alleged writing by the Founder of the Scientology religion out of context to draw an erroneous conclusion, hardly warrants the conclusion Minton now seeks: that all churches of Scientology should be treated differently than other litigants and denied basic rights and denied due process. In short, Minton asks the Court to discriminate against this litigant because it is a Church of Scientology. Such a result would be unlawful, unconstitutional, and manifestly unfair.
The Church does not dispute that in addition to Minton's efforts to reap a financial advantage through investments and through efforts to poison the jury pool in the Underlying Case, that he also possesses an abiding hatred and prejudice of the religion. Indeed, he has been held in criminal contempt in Clearwater, Florida for violating a restraining order not to harass Scientologists (Ex. 41), arrested in Boston for assaulting a Scientologist in front of the Church here (Ex.
19 42), arrested and tried in Clearwater for assaulting a Scientologist in front of the Church there (Ex. 43), and he has made his hatred more than obvious.
However, this religious prejudice is not a basis to deny the discovery needed here and authorized by the Florida court.
IV. CONCLUSION The discovery sought herein was made necessary by Minton's assertion of Fifth Amendment self?incrimination refusals to provide relevant information relating to the payments to witnesses and parties in the Underlying Case, his admitted destruction of records ordered by the Florida court to be produced, and refusal to acquire financial records from his banks. Minton's arguments are frivolous and are the latest in many months of attempts to re?litigate issues he has already lost.
Consequently, the motion for protective order should be denied and the Church awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees in having to oppose this motion. Respectfully submitted, Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, By its Attorneys, Brian . Gross, BBO #637718 COOLEY MANION JONES LLP 21 Custom House Street Boston, MA 02110?3536 (617) 737?3100 Of Counsel:
Kendrick L. Moxon Moxon & Kobrin 1100 Cleveland Street, Suite 900 Dated: November 27, 2001 Clearwater, FL 33755 20 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Brian D. Gross, hereby certify that a true copy of the Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization's Opposition to Robert S. Minton's Motion to Quash Subpoenas Directed to F1eetBoston and Fidelity or, in the Alternative for a Protective Order, and its Request for Hearing were served on this 27' day of November, 2001, to the following:
Linda M. Ricci, Esq., Hale & Dorr LLP, 60 State Street, Boston, MA 02109 (by hand delivery);
Kennan Dandar, Esq., Dandar & Dandar, P.A., 5340 West Kennedy Blvd., Suite 201, Tampa, FL 33607 (by overnight mail);
Jon Hayden, Esq., FleetBoston Law Department, Mail Stop MADE 10019C, 100 Federal Street, Boston, MA 02110 (by first class mail);
Colleen Hankins, Esq., Fidelity Investments, Mail Stop F9D, 82 Devonshire Street, Boston, MA 02109 (by first class mail).
Brian D Gross 62910 21
